IMPORTANCE During the past 20 years, numerous neuroimaging experiments have investigated aberrant brain activation during cognitive and emotional processing in patients with unipolar depression (UD). The results of those investigations, however, vary considerably; moreover, previous meta-analyses also yielded inconsistent findings.
of emotional and cognitive processing. 3, 4 Numerous neuroimaging experiments [5] [6] [7] [8] have investigated the neural correlates underlying these impairments, but their results vary considerably. This variance might be attributable to sampling effects in this heterogeneous disorder but also to the high degree of experimental and analytic flexibility in neuroimaging. Consequently, several quantitative meta-analyses have been performed to delineate brain regions consistently implicatedinUD 9-14 ( Figure 1 illustrates the different steps of a metaanalysis). However, these meta-analyses also yielded inconsistent findings ( Figure 2 ). This divergence across meta-analytic findings is perplexing. Several factors contribute to this predicament. First, most previous meta-analyses 9, 10, [12] [13] [14] used the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) approach to determine convergence of findings across experiments. Given that the null distribution in ALE reflects a random spatial association between findings across the entire brain, all included coordinates must be derived from whole-brain analyses. To our knowledge, most classic, explicit region-of-interest (ROI) analyses were not considered in previous UD meta-analyses. In contrast, hidden ROI analyses were often included by way of considering experiments of partial-brain coverage or reporting contrasts that were masked with a main effect in control individuals. However, inclusion of such results in neuroimaging meta-analyses render the null distribution and hence inference inappropriate (eTable 1 in the Supplement shows ROIs included in previous meta-analyses). Second, most previous meta-analyses attempted to correct for multiple comparisons by controlling the (voxel-level) false discovery rate (FDR), which is invalid for topological inference on smooth data 15, 16 and leads to inflated positive findings. Third, some earlier meta-analyses were performed across relatively low numbers of experiments. These metaanalyses have low power and are prone to yield clusters of convergence that are almost exclusively driven by single experiments. 16 Together, these factors may implicate a high number of spurious findings.
Key Points
Question How consistent are results of experiments investigating aberrant brain activity in unipolar depression and previous meta-analyses testing this topic?
Findings This conceptual replication of meta-analyses of 99 neuroimaging experiments in unipolar depression did not reveal any convergence, which is at odds with the findings of previous meta-analyses.
Meaning This result highlights the importance of reproducing previous results to be able to discover real effects for individual neuroimaging studies and for meta-analyses.
Figure 1. Schematic Illustration of the Steps of a Meta-analysis
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
Experiment No. Talairach  Coordinates   1  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  …  …  …   28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28  28 Finally, the focus of investigation has been variable across meta-analyses, with some summarizing cognitive and emotional experiments, others focusing on emotional or cognitive ones only, and yet others focusing on more specific aspects. Although in itself perfectly reasonable, this heterogeneity combined with the bias introduced by including ROI analyses and the high likelihood of false-positive findings may explain the heterogeneity seen in Figure 2 .
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Thus, the objective of the present investigation is to readdress aberrant brain activation during cognitive and emotional processing in UD using strict quality control and state-of-the-art meta-analyses. Furthermore, we aim to evaluate whether the lack of replication of meta-analyses in UD is the result of methodological problems or to differences in the specific focus of investigations. We thus performed analyses comparable to all objectives of previous metaanalyses. The present work is not a reproduction of previous meta-analyses (ie, including the same experiments as well as the same analytic procedures) but rather a conceptual replication of them. If inconsistent results of previous metaanalyses are attributable to differences in the specific focus of investigation, we should be able to replicate previous results with the respective meta-analysis focusing on the same aspect. A failure of replication, however, would point to methodological problems.
Methods
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
Details on the literature research can be found in the eMethods in the Supplement. In brief, neuroimaging experiments published from January 1, 1997, to October 1, 2015, were identified by a literature search of PubMed, Web of Science, and Google Scholar. To provide comprehensive, best-practice analyses of aberrant activation in patients with UD, we applied inclusion and exclusion criteria discussed below.
Criteria Related to the Investigation Participants
Included experiments statistically contrasted neural activation between an adult (>18 years) UD group (based on DSM-IV-TR 17 and DSM-5 18 or International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision 2 ) and a group of healthy controls. Experiments investigating patients with comorbidities were included, but with the criterion of UD as the main diagnosis. Exclusion of comorbidity would have reduced the size of the experiments by half. Furthermore, we only included experiments investigating patients with UD and current depressive clinical symptoms, whereas those experiments that investigated effects in groups with remission of symptoms were excluded. In the event that a study reported contrasts of different UD groups (eg, psychotic and nonpsychotic UD) against the same control group, only the results of the group that was most similar to those investigated in most of the studies (eg, nonpsychotic) were included. Therefore, we avoided inclusion of results that are based on the same control group and possibly reflect peculiarities of these groups. Analyses of group contrasts across several patient groups (ie, main effect of group comparing patients with UD, patients with schizophrenia, and controls) were only included when reporting post hoc results specific to the UD (vs control) group.
Figure 2. Illustration of Reported Peak Coordinates of Convergence Found in Previous Meta-analyses Investigating Aberrant Brain Activation in Unipolar Depression
Criteria Related to Experimental Design and Contrasts
We only included experiments that used an emotional or a cognitive task and reported group differences or group × condition interactions in task-related brain activity. Consequently, resting-state experiments and those reporting correlations and interactions with other variables (eg, group × performance interaction, correlation with clinical parameters) were excluded because they reflect taskunrelated and strongly specific effects, respectively. To keep the included contrasts and tasks as homogenous as possible we applied the following criteria.
First, emotional tasks were operationally defined as involving presentation of an emotional visual or auditory stimulus. At the contrast level, only group differences (UD vs controls) or group × condition interactions in an emotional vs nonemotional condition were included, whereas experiments investigating group effects (or interactions) between 2 emotional conditions (ie, sad vs happy) were excluded. These latter experiments report specific valence effects that strongly depend on the valence of the target and subtraction condition and cancel out general emotional processes. In addition, this exclusion criterion avoids multiple contrasts of the same participant groups (see below).
Furthermore, we excluded emotional regulation experiments, given that most studies contrasted a reappraisal against an emotional viewing condition and focused predominantly on regulatory mechanisms rather than emotional processing. These tasks can hence be expected to yield brain activations associated with cognitive regulation, whereas emotion-related regions are attenuated. 21 In addition, experiments focusing on anticipatory processing of emotions were excluded owing to the low number of available studies (n = 1). Second, cognitive tasks were operationally defined as involving a cognitive paradigm. At the contrast level, experiments were included that reported group differences (or interactions) between patients with UD and controls in a cognitive challenge compared with a control (less challenge or baseline) condition. Experiments investigating error-related activity were excluded (n = 3). This criterion was applied because most included cognitive experiments focused on activity in response to predominantly correct responses.
Studies reporting pharmacologic or psychological UD treatment effects were only included if they reported betweengroup differences at baseline or main effects of diagnosis. Treatment × group interactions were not considered.
To minimize the possibility that meta-analytic results are driven by within-group effects, 22 we limited the contribution of a particular group of participants to 1 experiment per class (with 2 classes for cognitive [increase and decrease] and 4 classes for emotional [increase, decrease, and positive and negative valence] tasks). Hence, if a study reported more than 1 contrast within the same class, these findings were pooled into a single experiment. For example, when a study reported between-group effects in response to angry and fearful faces, the coordinates of the 2 effects were coded as a single negative experiment (information on where this criterion applied is given in eTable 2B in the Supplement). ). We excluded studies with results obtained in ROI analyses (n = 17), experiments not covering the whole brain during image acquisition (n = 3), or experiments masking the group differences (or derived from a conjunction) with another contrast (n = 5) (the eMethods in the Supplement provides a detailed explanation).
Because the standard templates used in SPM (Statistical Parametric Mapping) since version SPM96 and FSL (FMRIB Software Library) are in MNI space, coordinates of experiments using SPM or FSL were treated as MNI coordinates if the authors did not explicitly report a transformation from MNI to Talairach space or the use of a different brain template.
These criteria resulted in inclusion of 57 studies with 99 different experiments (eTable 2 in the Supplement and Figure 3 ).
Different Meta-analytic Groupings
We performed 16 different meta-analyses (Figure 3) , with 12 of them corresponding to previously investigated metaanalytic questions (results of the overall analyses are reported in the eResults in the Supplement). We first calculated analyses across experiments independently if they reported increased or decreased brain activity in UD (compared with controls) (see eMethods in the Supplement for an explanation of the advantages of the pooled analysis). Because most previous meta-analyses reported their results separately for increases and decreases, we performed these analyses as well.
Separate meta-analyses were only performed when a sufficient number of experiments were available (>17 experiments).
16 Thus, analyses differentiating between increases and decreases in UD were not performed for sex discrimination, memory, face stimuli, and positive processing, and for negative processing only a subanalysis for increases was calculated ( Figure 3 ). All analyses (except those with <17 experiments) were repeated to examine (1) patients not receiving medication, (2) patients without comorbidities, (3) patients without late-life or geriatric depression, and (4) corrected results. tion can be found in the eMethods in the Supplement and Figure 1 . All results were thresholded at a cluster-level corrected threshold of P < .05 (cluster-forming threshold at voxellevel P < .001).
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Results
A total of 57 studies with 99 individual neuroimaging experiments, comprising 1058 patients were included in this analysis. There were 34 cognitive processing experiments and 75 emotional processing experiments; 50 experiments reported increased brain activity in UD, and 49 experiments reported decreased brain activity in UD. Figure 4A displays the distribution of foci of the emotional analyses. Figure 4B displays the distribution of foci of the cognitive analyses.
Meta-analyses Across Emotional Experiments
Meta-analyses Across Cognitive Experiments
Meta-analyses Controlling for Confounds
Analyses restricted to (1) patients not receiving medication, 
Discussion
Inconsistency of Neuroimaging Experiments in UD
Our most important result is the lack of significant convergence in almost all meta-analyses, which should not be attributable to a lack of statistical power. In particularly, Eickhoff et al 16 recently showed that for clusterwise corrected ALE metaanalyses, a minimum of 17 experiments is needed to achieve power of 80% to detect an effect occurring in one-third of the underlying population of experiments. This criterion was met by all performed analyses, with most being substantially larger and hence holding sufficient power to detect more subtle effects. Moreover, despite the stringent inclusion and exclusion criteria, our work represents, to our knowledge, the largest metaanalysis of task-based neuroimaging experiments in UD to date. We thus argue that our results indicate a lack of (spatial) convergence among neuroimaging findings in UD. Such heterogeneity and failure to confirm previous effects may be attributable to different factors, including experimental flexibility, that is, differences in experimental design and procedures. Finally, analytical flexibility, such as the choices of analysis software, preprocessing parameters, and most important, the specific contrasts calculated (ie, interactions or main effects), further adds to the heterogeneity of the current literature. We should highlight that 38 (38.4%) of all 99 experiments included in our analyses performed statistical inference without correction for multiple comparisons that additionally used various different thresholds. Although Lieberman and Cunningham 35 have argued that uncorrected inference is more sensitive to meaningful (small) effects, it also contaminates the literature with false-positive findings. 36 Unfortunately, taking into account an existing publication bias with negative results being less likely to be published compared with positive ones, 37 such false-positive findings based on invalid inference may actually be more likely to be published than null findings using valid inference. The only significant cluster we found was when we restricted the analyses to just corrected results. This finding additionally highlights the need for functional magnetic resonance imaging studies to correct for multiple comparisons and avoid false-positive findings. In summary, results indicate that neuroimaging results of UD are not consistent across experiments, which is most likely owing to a combination of experimental flexibility, heterogeneity across samples, and the widespread practice of uncorrected inference as well as publishing biases.
Failure to Replicate Meta-analyses
The observed lack of convergence across neuroimaging experiments of UD is at odds with the fact that previous metaanalyses in UD yielded significant findings. 9-14 However, considering the inconsistent findings across these previous metaanalyses, we argue that the current null result might actually reflect the most faithful representation of the current taskbased neuroimaging evidence in UD. Nevertheless, the fact that not only individual studies but also meta-analyses in UD have provided inconsistent findings is troubling. Reasons for this inconsistency may be methodological problems of previous analyses or the slightly varying scopes of them, with some focusing on general emotional or cognitive processing 14 ; others focusing specifically on negative, 9,11 sad, 13 or positive 9 emotions; and others pooling cognitive and affective processing. 10, 12 Although this methodological inconsistency should certainly explain some of the variability, the fact that we computed analyses for almost every scope previously addressed (except sad processing owing to a low number of experiments) but could not replicate any finding indicates a more generalized problem. Thus, based on the present results, we conclude that inconsistencies across previous meta-analyses are not owing to differences in their research question but rather to problems and differences in their methods. One factor seems to be the trade-off between robustness of the meta-analysis and heterogeneity and quality of the included experiments. Including more experiments ensures that convergence is not driven by single experiments and provides higher power for smaller effects, 16 but often also compromises the homogeneity of the included experiments (eg, pooling different tasks) and their quality (eg, including underpowered experiments). We tried to achieve a balance between homogeneity and robustness by setting strict inclusion and exclusion criteria. However, these efforts might have contributed to different results compared with previous metaanalyses in UD. For example, Graham and colleagues 12 included resting-state data and Diener and colleagues 10 included experiments in remitted UD, whereas others (including the present study) excluded these. Unfortunately, however, a detailed description of inclusion and exclusion criteria is often lacking in publications of meta-analytic results. A related problem that complicates comparison across meta-analyses is that most do not report in detail which specific experiments and contrasts were included, but only list the included studies. Given that most studies report several contrasts, just listing a study as included does not allow for reproducible meta-analyses. Another contribution to the inconsistency of previous metaanalyses and their discrepancy to the present null result might be less stringent exclusion criteria regarding experiments that do not reflect whole-brain analyses (eTable 1 in the Supplement). As mentioned, given that the null space in ALE is the entire brain, this aspect is crucial to render the analysis unbiased. In turn, inclusion of such studies will yield a self-fulfilling prophecy because regions that are more often specifically investigated will tend to show artificially high convergence. Thus, some previous metaanalyses might be biased by experiments that do not investigate aberrant activity in UD across the whole brain.
Still the biggest contribution is likely technical in nature. One important aspect is the small sample sizes, particularly in respect to the earliest neuroimaging meta-analyses. In addition to having low power and generalizability, an ALE-specific problem of small sample sizes is that in such analyses convergence is often driven by only 1 or 2 experiments. 16 Thus, previous meta-analyses in UD across a small number of experiments (eg, Fitzgerald and collegues 9 included <7 experiments) might have revealed convergence that is largely attributable to a single experiment. Moreover, we note that most of the previous meta-analyses 9, 10, [12] [13] [14] in UD controlled for the FDR. However, conventional (voxel-wise) FDR correction is not appropriate for inference on neuroimaging analyses such as ALE, 16 because topological inference on spatially smooth data (eg, ALE maps) may lead to spurious clusters.
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In particular, the combination of low sample size and FDR thresholding may have rendered previous meta-analyses very liberal, leading to an excessive emphasis on apparent convergence across the literature. Furthermore, the FDR correction in GingerALE prior to version 2.3.2 featured a bug, 38 which could have further exaggerated the problem of overly lenient thresholds in the previous meta-analyses on UD.
Recommendations and Outlook
Our results not only indicate inconsistencies across individual experiments investigating aberrant brain activity in UD, but in addition point to problems related to replication of neuroimaging meta-analyses. We suggest that this situation is not specific to UD and functional imaging because in 2011 and 2012, 3 different meta-analyses on structural changes in autism [39] [40] [41] were published that demonstrated some correspondence but importantly also some discrepancies. As outlined above, these discrepancies may relate to various conceptual and technical factors, but definite conclusions are difficult given the lack of descriptions at a level of detail that would enable full reproduction.
For clinical neuroimaging we would thus recommend a stronger focus on replication studies, rather than designing complex and newer paradigms. Furthermore, to make replication studies possible, authors must clearly report the specific characteristics of their sample (ie, comorbidity, age range, medication, and chronicity) and correct their results for multiple comparisons.
Neuroimaging meta-analysis is still a maturing yet rapidly developing field. As such, we consider the current case as motivation to formulate basic recommendations for future meta-analyses:
• Meta-analyses should be calculated across a reasonable amount of experiments 16 but concurrently be as homogeneous as possible with respect to the process investigated.
• The inclusion of explicit ROI analyses must be avoided, and attention should also be dedicated to exclude other cases of restricted analysis space.
• Voxel-level FDR thresholding is not a valid approach for statistical inference on smooth data, including neuroimaging meta-analyses.
• Meta-analyses should provide detailed inclusion and exclusion criteria, including a motivation for making these choices.
• Reporting standards must be improved to allow full reproducibility, 42 which includes listing the included studies and specific contrasts. Last, we note that although our results indicate inconsistencies in results of clinical neuroimaging and meta-analyses, we are still optimistic for the future of neuroimaging. In particular, reproducibility, replication, and data sharing have gained increased attention in the last few years. Our results and recommendations should thus contribute to the awareness of the importance of reproducing previous results.
Conclusions
The present study not only indicates inconsistencies across results of neuroimaging experiments in UD, but also points to replication problems of neuroimaging meta-analyses. These problems highlight the importance of replicating previous results of clinical neuroimaging studies and emphasize the need for better reporting and analysis standards (eg, no inclusion of ROI studies, no FDR correction) for meta-analyses. (https://scholar.google.de) searches for different combinations of the terms: "fMRI", "PET", "neural", "major depression", "depression", "major depressive disorder", "unipolar depression", "dysthymia", "emotion", "emotional", "affective", "cognitive", "task", "memory", "working memory", "inhibition", "control", "n-back", "stroop". Further papers were obtained by reference tracing of retrieved papers and previous meta-analyses on depression.
Please note that in ALE the common terminology distinguishes between a "paper" (a published item)
and an "experiment" (a set of coordinates originating from specific contrast analyses).
Exclusion of ROI results
It might be argued that by including only results from whole-brain experiments, meta-analyses might provide a biased view on the available literature. However, while results from ROI analyses are important and do add a lot to the current knowledge about the neural correlates of specific processes or clinical disorders, including them in quantitative coordinate-based meta-analysis would almost surely induce biased results. This is due to technical reasons, given that the inference of ALE is based on flat a priori likelihoods. That is, ALE aims to identify voxels where convergence across experiments is higher than expected under the null-hypothesis of random spatial association across the brain under the assumption that each voxel has the a priori same chance of being activated 2 . Including ROI-based analyses would violate this assumption and lead to inflated significance for the respective regions. For example, if all of the included studies performed a ROI analysis on the amygdala and consequently some of them reported activation of this structure, one would almost be guaranteed a significant convergence when assessing it against a null-hypothesis of random spatial convergence across the entire brain. However, this "finding" would be nothing but a propagation of the bias of looking specifically in the amygdala. Thus, to avoid bias and ultimately self-fulfilling prophecies, it is important to only include findings that are based on whole-brain analyses in a neuroimaging meta-analysis.
Reasons for pooling across increased and decreased activity in UD
In addition to performing analyses separately across experiments reporting increased (UD>Controls) or decreased (Controls>UD) brain activity in UD, we calculated analyses across experiments independent of reporting increases or decreases. This search for regions showing consistent aberrations of activity in UD has the advantage that it accommodates differences in how exactly group differences were calculated. That is, some experiments generated task versus control (or low level baseline) contrasts at the subject level, which was then compared between patients and controls. In contrast, other experiments reported group (patients versus control) x condition (task versus control) interactions at the second level.
Given that control conditions varied widely between experiments and effects of between-group differences in activation for these control conditions may rather unpredictably influence the overall direction of group differences, the pooled analysis searching for aberrant activation may thus provide the best summary of neuroimaging findings in UD.
Activation likelihood algorithm
All meta-analyses were performed according to standard analysis procedures as used previously (cf.
e.g. 1 ). Briefly, Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) meta-analyses 2-5 implemented as inhouse MATLAB (2014a) tools were performed. Differences in coordinate space (MNI vs. Talairach space) were accounted for by transforming coordinates reported in Talairach space into MNI coordinates using a linear transformation 6 . The key idea of ALE is to treat reported coordinates (foci) as centers of 3D Gaussian probability distributions, accounting for the spatial uncertainty associated with each focus. The width of these probability distributions is based on empirical data on the between-subject and betweentemplate variance. The between-subject variance is weighted by the number of examined subjects per experiment, as larger sample sizes should have a higher localizing power 3 . Importantly, in a lot of experiments included in the current meta-analyses the sample size of the patient and control groups was unequal. Thus, as the smaller sample determines spatial precision, the between-subject variance was weighted by the number of subjects of the smaller group.
For each experiment (which refers to a single contrast but also different contrasts of one paper coded as a single experiment as described in the inclusion/exclusion criteria in the method section of the main text), the probabilities of all foci reported in that experiment were aggregated. This was done by taking for each voxel the highest probability of any focus reported by that experiment 5 . This approach ensures that multiple foci of a single experiment that are in close vicinity are not cumulatively influencing the probability values. This then resulted in a voxel wise modeled activation (MA) map for each single experiment. Taking the union across the MA maps of all experiments yielded voxel-wise ALE scores describing the convergence of results at each particular location of the brain. To distinguish true convergence across experiments from random overlap, ALE scores were compared to an analytically derived null-distribution reflecting a random spatial association between experiments 2 . Hereby, a random-effects inference was invoked, focusing on inference on the above-chance convergence between experiments, not clustering of foci within a particular experiment. Conceptually, the null-distribution can be formulated as sampling a voxel at random from each of the MA maps and taking the union of these values in the same manner as done for the (spatially contingent) voxels in the true analysis 7 (for the analytical solution see 2 ). The p-value of a given voxel-wise ALE score was then given by the proportion of equal or higher values obtained under the null-distribution. The resulting non-parametric p-values for each meta-analysis were thresholded at a cluster level corrected threshold of p<0.05
(cluster-forming threshold at voxel-level p<0.001). Cluster level FWE correction was done as described in previous meta-analyses 8, 9 . First the statistical image of the uncorrected voxel-wise p-values of the original analysis was thresholded at the cluster-forming threshold of p<0.001. Then the size of the clusters surviving this threshold was compared against a null-distribution of cluster-sizes. This null distribution of cluster sizes was derived by simulating 5000 datasets of randomly distributed foci but with otherwise identical properties (number of foci, uncertainty) as the original dataset. This distribution was then used to identify the cluster-size, which was only exceeded in 5 % of all random simulations.
eDiscussion. Technical Considerations
It has to be noted, that the current meta-analytical study can't fully disentangle if the lack of convergence across neuroimanging results in UD is due to the heterogeneity in experimental or analysis procedures, sample characteristics, quality of clinical studies or simply to the real absence of localized neurobiological effects in UD. This is mainly due to the the fact that there are not enough experiments in order to be able to calculate more specific analyses. That is, if we for example wanted to test if the lack of convergence is due to heterogeneity in study design we would need enough experiments that used exactly the same experimental design. However, even more specific analyses like for example an analysis across experiments using facial stimuli are still quite heterogeneous given the diversity in tasks used (gender discrimination, emotion matching, emotion evaluation, mood induction….). Unfortunately, analyses across more homogeneous experiments would be underpowered and effects could be driven by single experiments. Thus, the question if our null results are due to the absence of localized neurobiological changes in UD or to the fact that clinical neuroimaging studies are too heterogeneous to discover consistent effects still remains open.
Furthermore, we want to highlight that the current meta-analytical study is not a reproduction of previous meta-analyses (i.e. including the same experiments as well as the same analyses procedures) but rather a conceptual replication of them. That is, due to the highly inconsistent results and obvious problems of previous analyses (inclusion of ROI analyses, FDR correction, inclusion of experiments reflecting effects in distinct processes like resting state activity) we readdressed the question of consistent aberrant activity during emotion and cognitive processing in UD by using best-practice analyses and including current literature. Thus, we avoided problems of previous analyses by applying strict inclusion/exclusion criteria and using state-of art approaches for our analyses and correction for multiple comparisons. In general, direct reproduction of previous meta-analyses is hindered by nontransparent reporting practices like only listing included papers but not experiments and no detailed descriptions of inclusion/exclusion criteria. Thus, the current meta-analytical study should raise awareness how important transparent reporting is in order to be able to replicate previous results. 
